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Abstract: Millstein (2009, 2010) defends the “causal interactionist population concept” 
(CIPC). Here I further defend the CIPC by showing how it clarifies another concept that 
biologists grapple with, namely, environment. Should we understand selection as ranging 
only over homogeneous environments or, alternatively, as ranging over any habitat area we 
choose to study? I argue instead that the boundaries of the population dictate the range of the 
environment, whether homogeneous or heterogeneous, over which selection operates. Thus, 
understanding the concept of “population” helps us to understand concepts of “selective 
environment,” exemplifying the importance of the CIPC to other concepts and debates. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Philosophers of science have been exploring the concept of "species" for decades, but 
the related and arguably more important concept in ecology and evolution, "population," has 
gone largely unexamined until very recently (e.g., Gannett 2003; Gildenhuys 2009; Millstein 
2009a, 2010; Godfrey-Smith 2009; Bouchard 2011). Elsewhere (Millstein 2009a, 2010), I  
defend a particular characterization of “populations,” the Causal Interactionist Population 
Concept (CIPC), first, through a demonstration that populations are individuals1 and second, 
by showing how the CIPC illuminates case studies that include populations, metapopulations, 
and patchy populations of various types. In this paper, I defend the CIPC in a different way; I 
show its usefulness in addressing a challenging conceptual and methodological issue in 
biology, namely, how to understand and deploy the concepts of “homogeneous environment” 
and “heterogeneous environment.” Thus, the first half of the paper is not on populations at 
all, but rather, on environment concepts; as a side benefit, I seek to further our understanding 
of these as well. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. I begin with background of a historical case, 
“The Great Snail Debate” of the 1950s,2 and show how during the course of that debate, a 
disagreement over heterogeneous environments arose. I then consider whether Robert 
Brandon’s or Richard Levins’s concepts of “environment” can settle the disagreement; I 
argue that they cannot do so without further enhancement. I then suggest that we can deploy 
the concept of “population” to enhance our environment concepts and settle the 
disagreement. However, the common population-as-deme view is inadequate to the task; I 
show how the CIPC can succeed where the population-as-deme view fails. Last, I offer some 
concluding thoughts. 
 
2. Heterogeneous Environments and “The Great Snail Debate” of the 1950s 
 
The focus of The Great Snail Debate was the grove snail, Cepaea nemoralis, a land 
snail that is found throughout Europe and England. It is a highly polymorphic species, and 
has been so since at least the Pleistocene, both in color (pink, brown, or yellow) and in the 
number of bands (having anywhere from zero to five visible bands). The snails live in 
numerous colonies3 of varying sizes, with some but very little migration between colonies. 
                                                
1 Drawing on the Ghiselin and Hull analysis of species as individuals (Ghiselin 1974, 1997; 
Hull 1976, 1978, 1980). 
2 Here I provide only a sketch; Millstein (2008, 2009b) gives greater detail. The moniker 
“Great Snail Debate” is due to Provine (1986). 
3 For the first part of the paper I use the term “colonies” rather than “populations,” in part 
because the disputants often used the term and in part not to beg any questions about what 
the populations were. Colonies can be understood as groupings of snails geographically 
Copyright Philosophy of Science 2014 
Preprint (not copyedited or formatted) 
Please use DOI when citing or quoting 
 
Different colors and different numbers of bands predominate in different colonies; for 
example, the majority of snails in one colony might be yellow while the majority in a 
different colony might be pink. Disputants in The Great Snail Debate sought to determine 
which evolutionary processes accounted for the contemporary colony distributions. 
There were two main camps involved in The Great Snail Debate. The first camp, 
Arthur J. Cain and Philip Sheppard, was studying the snails in England. They argued that the 
snail distributions were primarily due to selection, with little or no role for random drift. The 
second camp, Maxime Lamotte, was studying the snails in France. He agreed with Cain and 
Sheppard that the snail distributions were partially due to selection; however, he argued that 
there was in fact a substantial role for drift. Importantly, however, both camps agreed that 
there were correlations between snail colors and habitat backgrounds due to visual selection 
by predator; thrushes would find it harder to spot snails whose colors were similar to that of 
their background, giving the camouflaged snails an advantage in those environments. 
In the course of the debate, Cain and Sheppard criticized Lamotte’s inclusion of large 
colonies in his studies: 
 
Because backgrounds vary considerably over small distances, and the larger colonies 
will tend to be spread over larger areas and therefore over more types of background 
than the smaller ones,4 it is to be expected that large colonies will tend to be more 
alike, since the diverse effects of selection in different parts of each colony will tend 
to cancel out when the colony is considered as a whole, and in any case will be 
reduced to a certain extent by gene flow. Small colonies will tend to be on more 
homogeneous backgrounds, and will therefore become more diverse by selection. 
(1954, 110; emphasis added) 
 
In this passage, Cain and Sheppard seem to be suggesting that selection is occurring within 
microhabitats, and that by examining the whole (heterogeneous) environment of a particular 
colony, one would miss these more localized selection processes. Indeed, Cain and Sheppard 
stated that they were “avoiding those [localities] where there is a mixture of types of 
vegetable formations” (1954: 98). 
So, Cain and Sheppard seem to have thought that natural selection occurs in 
homogeneous environments, so that if a colony of snails was in a heterogeneous area, the 
data from these colonies should not be included because the effects of the selective processes 
in homogeneous microhabitats would average out. Lamotte, however, disagreed; he seems to 
                                                                                                                                                  
separated from other groupings of snails, with migration between the groupings difficult or 
impossible. 
4 Lamotte (1959) clarified that the larger areas were no more heterogeneous than the smaller 
areas; in subsequent publications, Cain and Sheppard changed their critique. However, the 
issue I want to highlight here is not the evaluation of their data sets, but rather the 
methodological and conceptual disagreement over heterogeneous environments. 
Copyright Philosophy of Science 2014 
Preprint (not copyedited or formatted) 
Please use DOI when citing or quoting 
 
have thought that evolutionary processes could occur across heterogeneous environments, 
and thus, data from colonies living in heterogeneous areas ought to be included. 
Homogenous environments, Lamotte asserted, were rare in France; he did his “best to study 
the populations in all possible environments” (1959: 70-2). 
But what does it mean for an environment to be heterogeneous or homogenous? And 
which is the relevant environment for evolutionary processes? 
 
3. Environment Concepts 
 
3.1. Brandon’s Concepts of “Environment” 
 
Robert Brandon has argued for the importance of understanding concepts of 
environment; as he notes in his co-authored paper with Antonovics and Ellstrand, “for the 
theory of natural selection to have explanatory power with regard to how adaptations 
originate, the concept of environment is important as that of fitness” (Antonovics et al. 1988, 
280). According to Brandon (1990), we need to distinguish between three different concepts 
of environment: 
 
1. external environment – the sum total of biotic and abiotic factors external to the 
organisms in question. 
 
Some of these factors may not affect organisms’ fitness or relative fitness, so an 
external environment can look heterogeneous but be homogeneous from the 
organisms’ point of view, which leads to the second concept of environment. 
 
2. ecological environment – consists of only those features of the external environment 
that affect the fitness of a given genotype; organisms “define” their environments. 
These are homogeneous when fitness values remain relatively constant across the 
area. 
 
3. selective environment – consists of only those features of the external environment 
that affect the relative fitnesses of multiple genotypes in an area. These are 
homogeneous when the relative fitness values remain relatively constant across the 
area (at a minimum, homogeneity requires that the ordinal relation of genotypes not 
change across the area). 
 
Brandon further suggests that organisms that are mobile enough to move between 
environmental patches are in a homogeneous selective environment: 
 
Moths fly around and land on many different trees. Their probability of being 
devoured by a bird depends on the match, or lack thereof, of their color and the 
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statistical average color of the background that they create by their behavior. Thus if 
the two tree types are distributed randomly about the woods and both types of moths 
show no behavioral preference for one type of tree over the other, then the woods in 
question are selectively homogeneous. (2005, 166) 
 
Moreover, Antonovics, Ellstrand, and Brandon argue that, understood properly, 
selection occurs in homogeneous selective environments5: 
 
If we grew one plant on good soil, and another on poor soil, the one on good soil 
would probably survive better, grow larger, and have more seed. Although we might 
be tempted to say one plant had a greater ‘fitness’ than the other, we are in this case 
referring to properties of the environment rather than to properties of the phenotypes 
of those plants which would explain their differential success... In other words for the 
theory of natural selection to have explanatory power, we must compare the fitness of 
different phenotypes in identical environments. Conversely, two environments can be 
thought of as homogeneous (with regard to selection) if their effect on the relative 
fitness of phenotypes is the same. It is within such selectively homogeneous 
environments that differential fitness is the result of properties of the organism and 
within which the theory of natural selection therefore has explanatory power. (1988, 
280; emphasis added) 
 
If Cain and Sheppard held views similar to these, and if they thought that the snails were not 
very mobile (i.e., not mobile enough to move between environmental patches in some areas), 
then they would have thought that in some cases the snails were not in homogeneous 
selective environments. Thus, (again assuming that Cain and Sheppard’s views were similar 
to Brandon’s), they would have refused to consider data from colonies in heterogeneous 
environments, as they indeed did. 
 
3.2. Levins’s Concepts of “Environment”  
 
Although many philosophers are familiar with Brandon’s concepts of environment, 
those of Richard Levins (1968) are better known among biologists. Levins classifies 
environments in evolutionary contexts somewhat differently than Brandon; instead of two 
categories of selective environment (homogeneous and heterogeneous), there are three: 
 
1. homogeneous environment - organisms spend their lives in a uniform environment. 
 
2. fine-grained heterogeneous environment - organisms disperse freely among many 
patches (in space or time) during the course of their lifetime.  
                                                
5 Brandon (1990) and Damuth (1985) make similar arguments. 
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3. coarse-grained heterogeneous environment - organisms spend their lives in one 
patch. 
 
Note that intermediates between the extremes of “fine-grain” and “coarse-grain” are possible, 
i.e., organisms may spend their lives in more than one patch, yet not disperse freely enough 
so that they experience them with a frequency equivalent to that of the environment. 
However, in many cases the extremes are reasonable approximations, and so in what follows 
I ignore the possibility of intermediates. 
The category of fine-grained heterogeneous environments marks a difference between 
Brandon’s typology and Levins’s; recall that such an environment would count as 
homogeneous for Brandon. That difference is important because certain phenomena may be 
expected in a fine-grained heterogeneous environment that would not necessarily be expected 
in a Levins-sense homogeneous one. For example, selection for adaptive plasticity is more 
likely in a fine-grained environment than it is in one that is Levins-sense homogenous; 
organisms in fine-grained environments are also more likely to experience constrained 
geographic ranges if interbreeding inhibits adaptation to environmental extremes (see Table 
1). Therefore, the concepts of “fine-grained heterogeneous environment” and “homogeneous 
environment” should not be collapsed. Levins’s typology is superior to that of Brandon’s in 
that respect. 
However, Brandon is certainly right to emphasize that organisms determine the 
nature of the selective environment. (Not that Levins would likely disagree; after all, the 
distinction between fine-grained and coarse-grained is itself organism-centered). Thus, the 
two typologies might be profitably (but tentatively – I make further refinements below) 
combined as follows: 
 
1. homogeneous selective environment – consists of only those features of the external 
environment that cause the relative fitnesses of multiple genotypes in an area to 
remain relatively constant across the area.  
 
2. fine-grained heterogeneous selective environment – consists of only those features 
of the external environment that cause the relative fitnesses of multiple genotypes in 
an area to vary across the area, where organisms disperse freely among many patches 
(in space or time) during the course of their lifetime. 
 
3. coarse-grained heterogeneous selective environment – consists of only those 
features of the external environment that cause the relative fitnesses of multiple 
genotypes in an area to vary across the area, where organisms spend their lives in one 
patch. 
 
A couple of clarifications here: first, the term “selective environment” should not be taken to 
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exclude other evolutionary processes from occurring in the same area, drift in particular. 
Second, speaking of a heterogeneous selective environment might seem to be begging the 
question against Brandon. In section 4.2, I explain why such a locution is sensible and 
desirable. 
 
3.3. Incompleteness of Environment Concepts 
 
Even by combining the best elements of Levins’s and Brandon’s concepts, we can’t 
settle the question of which environments to consider in the snail studies because in many 
cases it will be unclear when we have homogeneous environments and when we have 
heterogeneous environments. To see this, consider the region shown in Figure 1, consisting 
of three patch types relevant to the fitness of the organisms (e.g., pink, brown, and yellow 
snails distributed across pinkish, brownish, and yellow-greenish backgrounds). Suppose the 
snails only regularly move between some patches: between a, b, c, and d; between e, a, and f; 
and within (but not outside of) g. Now consider three ways of drawing area boundaries: 
 
1. Around each patch individually, so that there are there are seven areas. 
2. Around the entire region depicted, so that there is one area. 
3. Around b, c, and d, including some of a; around e and f, including some of a; and 
around g, including some of a. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: A patchy region. a is one patch type (e.g., brownish background), b is second 
patch type (e.g., pinkish background), and c, d, e, f, and g are a third patch type (e.g., yellow-
greenish background). 
 
If the boundaries are drawn the first way, there are seven homogeneous environments. If the 
boundaries are drawn the second way, there is one coarse-grained heterogeneous 
environment. If the boundaries are drawn the third way, there are three heterogeneous 
environments, two of which are fine-grained and one of which is coarse-grained. 
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This variability in classifying environments as homogenous, coarse-grained 
heterogeneous, or fine-grained heterogeneous arises because both Levins and Brandon are 
silent on the question of how one delineates the boundaries of a selective environment. Thus, 
the Brandon and Levins environment concepts are incomplete. They cannot help to settle 
disputes (like the one between Lamotte and the team of Cain and Sheppard) over which areas 
to include in one’s data set because they are not powerful enough to determine which areas 
are heterogeneous and in what way. Yet, whether the environments are fine-grained or 
coarse-grained matters; Table 1 compares the predictions of a fine-grained heterogeneous 
environment to that of a coarse-grained one. 
 
Table 1 
A comparison of selection trajectory predictions  (ceteris paribus*) 
Fine-grained environments  Coarse-grained environments Source 
Fixation for allele favored on 
average across patches† 
Fixation of locally favored 
alleles within patches  
Spieth (1979) 
Monomorphism† Polymorphism Levene (1953), Levins and 
MacArthur (1966), Hedrick et 
al. (1976) 
Single generalist species Multiple specialized species Brown and Pavlovic (1992) 
Adaptive plasticity  No particular pattern of 
plasticity (instead, local 
adaptation) 
Levins (1963), Gillespie 
(1974), Pigliucci et al. (2003), 
Banta et al. (2007) 
Constrained numbers of 
organisms and geographic 
range 
Increasing numbers of 
organisms and geographic 
range 
Kirkpatrick and Barton 
(1997) 
* e.g., excluding habitat choice, heterosis. 
† unless there is very strong selection to overcome interbreeding; see, e.g., Slatkin (1987). 
 
Consider, for example, the first row of Table 1. If organisms are frequently changing 
selectively relevant patches in space or time (a fine-grained environment), then even though a 
trait might be advantageous for an organism in one patch (e.g., a yellow snail in a yellow-
greenish background), that same trait might be disadvantageous in another patch (e.g., a 
yellow snail in a pinkish background). Such a trait might therefore be selected against. The 
trait that would do best is one that, while it is perhaps not particularly advantageous in any of 
the patches, is one that is the most favorable on average (or, alternatively, as the fourth row 
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of the table indicates, an adaptively plastic trait). It is fairly straightforward to see how this 
might lead to a monomorphic population (second row) with no particular predisposition to 
speciate (third row); moreover, organisms might have difficulty expanding their numbers 
outside of the range if the edges of the range are much different from the habitat in the 
interior (fifth row). On the other hand, if organisms are spending their lives in one patch (a 
coarse-grained environment), they can more easily adapt to their particular patch, perhaps 
leading to fixation of the favored allele (first row) and thus, polymorphism, since there are 
different adaptations within the species (second row). Over time, these polymorphisms might 
become separate species (third row); however, there is no particular expectation of adaptive 
plasticity (fourth row) or reason to think that organisms are limited in their numbers or 
geographic range (fifth row).  
In short, Table 1 shows that if boundaries are drawn any way that one chooses, one 
risks making the wrong predictions because the location of an environment’s boundaries 
affects whether the environment is fine-grained or coarse-grained (as the discussion of Figure 
1 shows). Thus, to deploy our environment concepts in a way that preserves our ability to 
make accurate predictions, we need a principled way to draw the boundaries.  
 
4. The Population Concept Completes the Environment Concepts 
  
My suggestion, consistent with the standard view that it is populations that undergo 
evolution, is that populations dictate the boundaries of the selective environment. 6 More 
specifically, the boundaries of the environment would be delineated by the fullest extent of 
the spatial location of the population. To illustrate, consider Figure 1 again. If there were 
separate populations in each of the seven background patches, then there would be seven 
separate homogeneous environments. On the other hand, if populations were to occur in 
more than one background patch, then the environment(s) would be heterogeneous; then, 
based on the frequency of organisms changing patches in space and time, we could determine 
whether a given heterogeneous environment is fine-grained or coarse-grained. 
Here are four advantages of recognizing that populations bound environments (more 
later). First, I think this recognition is implicitly assumed in the widely used Levins typology 
of environments.7 Second, it follows Brandon’s reasonable intuition that environments 
should be understood relative to the organisms that inhabit them. Third, it avoids the 
problems of an “anything goes” boundary solution, which would not be consistent with the 
different predictions in different types of environments shown in Table 1. And fourth, it 
respects the types of predictions of homogeneous environment vs. fine-grained vs. coarse 
grained; note that these were mostly population-level predictions (e.g., polymorphism, 
fixation, etc.), and that the predictions reflect the “common fate” experienced by organisms 
                                                
6 See Glymour (2011) and Abrams (2014) for alternate views. 
7 As Templeton and Rothman (1978) note, “Levins and many other authors use grain at the 
population level” (176). 
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of the same population. 
So, we need a population concept to delineate the environment that organisms are 
evolving in. But which population concept? 
 
4.1. Population-as-deme  
 
The most common answer among population geneticists is that populations are demes 
– i.e., groups of actively interbreeding organisms of the same species. If we take my 
suggestion that populations delineate environments together with the population-as-deme 
view, then the boundaries of the environment would be delineated by the fullest extent of the 
spatial location of the interbreeding organisms.  
However, the population-as-deme view is problematic. To see why, suppose that a 
population sensu deme is spread across a heterogeneous environment with two patches. 
Suppose further that over time, local adaptation occurs each of the habitat patches, and that 
over time, organisms in the different patches may differentiate enough so that we would call 
them different species on some reasonable species concept. (Species that exhibit 
configurations similar to this include threespine stickleback fish, metal-tolerant grasses, and 
hawthorn and apple maggots (Rhagoletis pomonella)). Under this scenario, there could be 
significant differentiation between organisms, but unless there were a significant change in 
breeding patterns, there would still only be one population according to the population-as-
deme view. Thus, breeding-related differentiation would count (e.g., habitat choice, 
assortative mating) but non-breeding-related differentiation would not (e.g., differential 
adaptation), even though both types of differentiation can lead to speciation.  
This seems arbitrary and incomplete. Arguably, one aspect of being a population is as 
a possible precursor to a new species, yet some precursors are not recognized (while others 
are). The significant differentiation prior to speciation ought to be recognized conceptually, 
especially since differential adaptation with linkage can limit gene flow. The failure to do so 
is a flaw of the population-as-deme view. 
 
4.2. The Causal Interactionist Population Concept (CIPC) 
 
The Causal Interactionist Population Concept (CIPC) is an alternative to the 
population-as-deme view. Details of the view can be found elsewhere (Millstein 2009a, 
2010); here I summarize briefly. The CIPC characterizes populations in ecological and 
evolutionary contexts8 as consisting of at least two conspecific organisms who, over the 
course of a generation, are actually engaged in survival or reproductive interactions, or both. 
The boundaries of the population are the largest grouping for which the rates of interaction 
                                                
8 This qualification recognizes that other areas of study, such as statistics and biomedicine, 
may have alternative population concepts. 
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are much higher within the grouping than outside.9 Both reproductive and survival 
interactions should be understood broadly; relevant interactions include both unsuccessful 
and successful matings (interbreeding), offspring rearing, competition for limited resources, 
and cooperative activities.  
Recall the scenario where there was local adaptation within two patches with 
widespread interbreeding across patches. Now suppose that in addition to reproductive 
interactions within and between organisms in patches, there were significant survival 
interaction rates within (but not between) patches. Since the rates of causal interactions 
within patches are significantly greater than the rates of causal interactions more generally, 
on the CIPC there are two populations (that may later become two species). Thus, there are 
two homogeneous evolutionary environments whose boundaries are delineated by the spatial 
range of the causal interactions of the two populations. Since there are some interactions 
across the two populations, they form a metapopulation10 across a heterogeneous 
environment (probably, but not necessarily, coarse-grained, if interactions are a good proxy 
for the movement of organisms through space and time). Therefore the CIPC, unlike the 
population-as-deme view, preserves the idea that splitting into populations precedes splitting 
into species. On the other hand, according to the CIPC, if the rates of causal interactions 
within patches were not significantly greater than the rates of causal interactions more 
generally, then there would be only one population evolving in a heterogeneous environment 
(probably, but not necessarily, fine-grained – again, it would depend on the movement of 
organisms through space and time).  
Note that using the CIPC (or the population-as-deme view, for that matter) to 
delineate the boundaries of the selective environment entails that selection can occur across a 
heterogeneous environment, contra the view of Brandon and others that selection should be 
understood within homogeneous environments only. Indeed, the authors cited in Table 1 
suggest that thinking of selection occurring across heterogeneous environments is 
widespread. But is it legitimate? Recall that on Brandon’s view, fine-grained heterogeneous 
environments are considered homogenous, so it is only the coarse-grained ones that are 
controversial. Brandon handles the latter type of case by calling selection within a selectively 
homogeneous environment simple natural selection, whereas selection in coarse-grained 
environments is compound natural selection – “a process consisting of natural selection 
within environments and distribution into environments” (1990, 73). For example, suppose 
the pollen and seeds of two plant genotypes are randomly distributed across two habitat 
                                                
9 Here I draw on Simon (2002). 
10 According to the Causal Interactionist Metapopulation Concept, metapopulations consist of 
at least two local populations (as characterized above) of the same species, linked by 
migration or dispersal, such that organisms occasionally change which population they are a 
part of; rates of interaction within local populations are much higher than the rates of 
interaction among local populations (Millstein 2010). 
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patches, one where the soil contains heavy metals and one where it does not.11 On Brandon’s 
view, the distribution forms the first part of the process of compound natural selection. Then 
suppose that there is selection within each of the environmental patches, with one genotype 
being favored in the soil that contains heavy metals and the other genotype being favored in 
the soil that does not contain heavy metal. The selection within these two environments is the 
second part of the process, according to Brandon. So, although Brandon does speak of 
selection within heterogeneous environments, in truth on his account the selection part of 
compound natural selection is occurring within homogeneous selective environments; only 
the distribution occurs across heterogeneous environments. 
However, there are reasons to think that selection itself can occur across 
heterogeneous environments, as using the CIPC as an environment delineator would imply. 
Consider (as Brandon would readily acknowledge) that there are reproductive interactions 
occurring across the habitat patches. In addition, there are likely to be survival interactions 
occurring across patches, particularly between plants who are near the borderline between the 
two patches; for example, the plants on different sides of the patch will probably be 
competing for water, for nutrients in the soil, for light, for root space. Even if two plants on 
different sides of the border are not competing directly, they may be affected by the 
competition between the plants that are the border, meaning that because of those near-border 
competitions there is more or less water available for them, more or fewer nutrients, etc. 
These sorts of survival interactions – examples of Darwin’s “struggle for existence” – are 
part of the process of natural selection. It thus does not make sense, in situations such as 
those described here, to say that there two separate selection processes when in fact all of the 
organisms in both patches are engaged in a struggle for existence and in reproductive 
interactions (also part of natural selection) with one another. Of course, it is also possible that 
there are cases where few or no interactions occur across patches, or where those interactions 
were very much fewer than the interactions within the patches; in those cases, there would be 
two separate selection processes going on in two separate environments. These 
considerations vindicate the CIPC approach to environment delineation.12 
Furthermore, unlike the population-as-deme view, the CIPC helps us understand 
debates like The Great Snail Debate. Recall that Cain and Sheppard disagreed with Lamotte 
over the relevant type of environment for evolutionary processes. Cain and Sheppard thought 
that each individual patch within the area is its own (homogenous) environment, and that 
these should be studied separately, whereas Lamotte thought that one heterogeneous area as a 
whole characterizes the environment. If the rates of interactions within patches were much 
higher than the rates of interactions between patches, then in a sense both camps were right. 
                                                
11 This example is modified from one that Brandon describes later in his book, drawn from 
the work of Antonovics et al. (1971). 
12 Note that similar considerations apply to understanding drift across heterogeneous 
environments and that the delineation via populations would therefore be the same as for 
selection. 
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Cain and Sheppard’s view would let us study the dynamics of the populations, while 
Lamotte’s view would let us study the dynamics of the metapopulation. However, if the rates 
of interactions were more or less consistent across patches, then Lamotte was right. We 
should study a colony’s entire heterogeneous environment. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
I have argued that we ought to characterize our environment concepts as described in 
Section 3.2 with the CIPC-based delineations specified in Section 4.2. When trying to 
understand the evolution of organisms spread over heterogeneous areas, the CIPC directs us 
to, first, pay attention to the interactions of organisms across the landscape; second, identify 
the fullest extent of the densest pockets of survival and reproductive interactions – i.e., the 
populations, and third, delineate the environments based on the geographic range of the 
populations. Once that is done, we can determine whether the environments are 
homogeneous or heterogeneous, and if heterogeneous, whether coarse-grained or fine-
grained (based on the dispersal abilities of the organisms). We can then determine the 
appropriate models to apply to our study populations. 
The case for a population concept in evolutionary and ecological contexts, and the 
Causal Interactionist Population Concept (CIPC) more specifically, now rests on 1) a 
demonstration that populations are individuals (Millstein 2009a); 2) an illustration of how the 
CIPC illuminates a variety of different population structures (continuous populations, 
metapopulations, patchy populations, etc.) for a variety of species13 (Millstein 2010); and 3) 
an argument that the CIPC is required for understanding and deploying concepts of 
homogeneous and heterogeneous environment (this paper). Furthermore, the discussion 
above hints at other roles for the CIPC to play. Since selection in heterogeneous 
environments is thought to be one mechanism through which sympatric speciation can occur, 
the CIPC may help clarify this somewhat controversial process by elucidating the separation 
of populations prior to the separation of species. In addition, since the 1950s many other 
processes have been proposed to explain the distributions of the Cepaea nemoralis 
populations, including repeated extinction and recolonization of habitat patches (Cameron 
and Pannett 1985, Cameron 2001), founder effects (Cameron and Dillon 1984), and rare, 
long distance migrations (Davison 2000); a robust population concept like the CIPC would 
seem to be relevant to each of these phenomena. However, these are topics for another day.
                                                
13 The case studies include Linanthus parryae (desert snow, a flowering plant), Pseudomonas 
(bacteria), Chrysomela aeneicollis (montane willow leaf beetle), Eubalaena australis 
(Southern Ocean right whale), and Gasterosteus aculeatus (threespine stickleback fish). In 
other words, not just land snails. 
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